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Abstract
This paper studies asymmetry of information and transfers within a unique data set of 712 extended
family networks from Tanzania. Using cross-reports on asset holdings, we construct measures of
misperception of income among all pairs of households belonging to the same network. We show that
there is significant asymmetry of information and no evidence of major systematic over-evaluation
or under-evaluation of income in our data, although there is a slight over-evaluation on the part
of migrants regarding non-migrants. We develop a static model of asymmetric information that
contrasts altruism, pressure and exchange as motives to transfer. The model makes predictions
about the correlations between misperceptions and transfers under these competing explanations.
Testing these predictions in the data uncovers the active role played by the recipient. Our findings
suggest that the recipient sets the terms of the transfers, either by exerting pressure to give on the
donor or by holding the bargaining power during the exchange of services with the donor.
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1 Introduction
Private transfers among extended family members are pervasive in developing countries (Cox and
Fafchamps (2008)). For several decades a strand of the literature has investigated the determinants
of these transfers (Lucas and Stark (1985), Rapoport and Docquier (2006)). That literature has,
however, typically assumed perfect information between family members.
In contrast, a growing literature on migration suggests that there could be substantial asym-
metry of information among close relatives. McKenzie, Gibson, and Stillman (2012) show that
potential migrants in Tongo underestimate their future earnings as migrants in New Zealand, and
especially so if they have relatives there. Seshan and Zubrickas (2015) studies a sample of Indian
wives with migrant husbands in Qatar and finds substantial asymmetry of information. Among a
sample of Senegalese migrants in France, Italy and Mauritania, Seror (2012) shows that migrants
make mistakes on the asset ownership of the family members remaining in Senegal.
One expects asymmetry of information to matter for private transfers. Using lab experiments
in the field to vary the the observability of gains, Jakiela and Ozier (2015), in the context of close
relatives, and Ambler (2015), in the context of migrants, show that subjects transfer less to other
family members when their gains are not made public. Seshan and Zubrickas (2015) finds that
the more wives of Indian migrants working in Qatar under-estimate the overseas income of their
husbands, the lower the share of income sent home as annual remittances. Nyarko, Joseph, and
Wang (2015) find remittances from workers in the UAE are more strongly correlated with more
easily observable variation in earnings. Batista and Narciso (2013) observe higher remittances from
a sample of migrants in Ireland when they are offered free phone cards and argue that it is due to
improved information.
This paper uses a unique dataset of 712 extended family networks originating the Kagera region
in Tanzania to study asymmetry of information and private transfers within these networks. Making
use of cross-reports on asset ownership among households belonging to the same extended family
networks, we measure each household’s misperceptions about the living standards of the other
households in its network. We develop a static model of asymmetric information that contrasts
altruism, pressure and exchange as motives to transfer. The model makes predictions about the
correlations between misperceptions and transfers under these competing explanations. Taking
these predictions to the data we determine partial correlation coefficients between transfers and
misperceptions. We find that transfers co-move with the recipient’s misperception of the donor’s
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wealth, but not with the donor’s misperception of the recipient’s wealth. This is consistent with
a relationship where the recipients have power and request transfers from the donor, either using
pressure to give or in exchange of services.
We believe that our paper makes a number of contributions. The first one is methodological:
our paper provides a coherent and generally applicable approach to measuring asymmetric infor-
mation through surveys. In many environments of interest, household income is generated from
smallholder farming or informal non-agricultural businesses and a large share of consumption is
home-produced. In such contexts, measuring self-reported household income is already problem-
atic (Deaton (1997)), so we think that measuring household perceptions of other people’s income
would not be a promising avenue. In contrast, questions on self-reported asset holdings are ubiq-
uitous in household surveys and are an attractive indicator of medium term standards of living.
Eliciting beliefs from respondents about asset holdings of others is both feasible and can be done
at very low cost in linked surveys.
However, it raises the question of how to translate these questions on various assets into house-
hold beliefs regarding the living standards of others. Our method consists of using a weighted
sum of differences between believed and actual asset holdings. The weights are set depending on
how these particular assets predict consumption in the population. Naturally, since this measure
of misperception is based on assets, it captures asymmetry of information regarding medium term
income, but would not capture asymmetry of information regarding short term shocks. As the
collection of linked survey data is becoming more common in developing countries, in particular
within the literatures on network and migration, the data collection instrument used in this paper
could be easily rolled out in other surveys.
Our second contribution is descriptive in nature. As part of an existing data collection which
interviewed linked households from 712 extended family networks from Tanzania, a novel module
measured beliefs about asset holdings of other households within the same network. This allows
us to give a complete characterization of the asymmetry of information among extended family
networks. Not surprisingly, we find substantial levels of asymmetry of information and show that
it correlates positively with genetic, social and physical distance between households. However,
perceptions are, on average, roughly correct. There is also no evidence of large, systematic under- or
over-estimates across different types of households. Non-migrants underestimate migrants’ income
by about 1.8% on average and migrants overestimate non-migrants’ income by about 5.2%, which is
consistent with McKenzie, Gibson, and Stillman (2012) and Seror (2012). For the median migrant-
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stayer pair, however, there is no misperception in either direction.
Our third contribution is to relate transfers to misperceptions by developing simple theoretical
models of transfers and asymmetry of information regarding the recipient and donor’s income.1 We
compare three possible motives for transfers in this model: altruism, in which the potential donor
cares about the recipient; pressure, in which the recipient has some means of imposing a utility cost
on the donor; and exchange, in which the transfer represents a payment for some good or service
provided by the recipient. Our model of altruism predicts a negative partial correlation of transfers
with both the recipient’s actual income and the donor’s misperception of that income. Our model
of exchange also predicts a negative partial correlation between the transfer and the recipient’s
income if the donor has all the bargaining power. In contrast, if pressure is the driving motivation
or an exchange motive in which the recipient has all the bargaining power, it is the donor’s income
and the recipient’s misperception of the donor’s income that matter and are positively correlated
with the transfers. Note that these models capture not only the effect of information on transfers,
but also the feedback mechanisms whereby transfers themselves, or the amount requested, are
informative.
Finally, our findings highlight that the recipient plays an active role in his relationship with the
donor. Rather than being a passive receiver, we find that he sets the terms of the transfers, either
by exerting pressure to give on the donor or by holding the bargaining power during the exchange
of services with the donor. This is consistent with the experimental evidence of Jakiela and Ozier
(2015) and Ambler (2015), and the large ethnographic literature highlighting the importance of
disapproval, shaming, ostracism and other means of pressure, as described and cited in Platteau
(2012) and Chort, Gubert, and Senne (2012).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data on extended family
networks in Tanzania that we use to build the measures of asymmetry of information. These
measures are defined and validated in Section 3. Section 4 describes misperceptions of income and
how they relate to measures of closeness. Section 5 presents competing models of transfers and
how they relate to misperceptions of income between two households belonging to a family network.
Section 6 studies the correlations between transfers and misperceptions of income to examine the
1Since our measure of misperception concerns medium term income and we have one-time observations, the models
are static and considers a potential donor and recipient having each some private information regarding their income.
This differs from Cole and Kocherlakota (1999), Attanasio and Pavoni (2011) and Kinnan (2009) who explore the
interesting dynamic effects arising from asymmetry of information regarding short term shocks in infinitely-repeated
games.
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empirical validity of the models and Section 7 concludes.
2 Data
This paper uses two waves of the Kagera Health and Development Survey (KHDS). The original
survey (KHDS 1991-94) interviewed 915 households in 52 villages representative of the Kagera
Region of Tanzania over four rounds from 1991 to 1994. This region, in the north-western part
of the country, has a population of 2.5 million people, the vast majority of whom depend on
agriculture as the main source of income. The Kagera region is relatively isolated: it borders
landlocked countries Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi and is 1,400 km away from the main port and
commercial capital of the country, Dar es Salaam. Research using the data that underlie this paper
has shown that diversification of income generating activities and migration are key household
strategies for growth (De Weerdt (2010) and Beegle, De Weerdt, and Dercon (2011), respectively).
KHDS 2010 attempted to trace all individuals on any original household roster and administer
a full household interview in the household in which they were found residing in 2010. The survey
attained very high recontact rates. Out of the original 915 households there are only 71 households
(8%) where not a single individual was traced (excluding 26 households where all members had
died). The interviewing team accounted, in 2010, for 88% of the 6,353 individuals listed on any
KHDS91-94 roster: 68% of the original respondents were visited and the household in which they
lived were administered a household interview, while 20% of respondents were confirmed to have
died and the circumstances of their death were recorded through an interview with an informant
(often during the household interview with other surviving household members). 12% of individuals
were not found.2 Out of the interviewed individuals 45% were found residing in the baseline village,
53 percent had migrated within the country, 2 percent to another East African country (primarily
Uganda) and 0.3 percent had moved outside of East Africa.
Practically, we take advantage of this unique data structure to define a split-off household as
any household that contains at least one member from the original roster and an extended family
network as a network of split-off households, all originating from the same baseline household. Each
household interview probed, through a network roster, for relationships and interactions between
2Given the very long period of 16 years between the surveys the attrition rate in KHDS 2010 is extremely low
relatively to other panels (Alderman et al. 2001)).
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the current household and any split-off household.3 For example, if the original members have split
into three different households, the network consists of these three households and each household
is asked questions about the other two, giving us a data set of 6 dyadic observations.
What makes these data so particularly suited to shed light on our research question is, first,
that we have data on both sides of each pair of linked households in the networks. That allows
us to cross-check the beliefs held by one household about the other with reality as recorded in the
questionnaire. Secondly, this survey is one of the few that tracks respondents outside the immediate
vicinity of the enumeration area. While there are undoubtedly information asymmetries between
households residing in the same locality, these may be more subtle and harder to measure. In our
geographically disperse networks information asymmetries are salient - and below we will see that
physical distance is strongly correlated with the degree of misperception between two households.
In empirical applications networks are typically self-defined, with questionnaires probing each
respondent for a list of network partners. Our network definition is quite different as it is based
on membership in a household 18 years ago. Our definition has the distinct advantage of being
well-defined and exogenous, alleviating econometric concerns related to sampled networks (Chan-
drasekhar and Lewis (2011)). Attrition aside, we have complete networks defined in this way. Of
course, as is nearly always the case in the literature, this network includes only a subset of house-
holds to or from whom transfers are sent or received. We can quantify the share of the transfers
that we are capturing by comparing the within-network transfers to transfers coming from outside
the network. We see that for households receiving transfers, 51% of the donors are from within the
extended family network as defined in this paper. Similarly, 51% of the total value of the transfers
received is from within that network.
After dropping households that did not split or have missing or incomplete interviews, our
sample consists of 3,173 households, from 712 families, yielding 13,808 unique within-family pairwise
combinations of households. The principal strategy for tracing people from the original KHDS
household rosters was to obtain their contact details through interviewed relatives. We should
expect attrition rates to be higher among households that have infrequent contact with their family
members. Indeed, out of all dyads in our sample 53% communicated at least once in the month
preceding the survey, while for 5% the last communication was over 5 years ago. By contrast,
the reports from interviewed households about untraced households (which constitute dyads that
are dropped from the analysis) show that only 26% of such pairs communicated within the last
3De Weerdt and Hirvonen (2015) use this same network to study how consumption co-moves across linked nodes
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month and 23% over 5 years ago. In what follows, then, it is useful to keep in mind that we are
likely looking at a somewhat more connected set of family members who are not living in the same
location.
Some (but not all) of the asymmetric information questions were skipped for split-off households
residing in the same location as the respondent. Wherever the analysis below makes use of these
skipped questions, we revert to a subsample of 9,032 dyads, all living in different locations, and
encompassing 2,807 households within 613 extended family networks. Within this subsample 41%
of dyads communicated within the past month and 7% within the past year.
Finally, significant resources were spent on collecting detailed consumption data on each inter-
viewed household. The questionnaire included extensive food and non-food consumption modules,
carefully designed to maintain comparability across survey rounds. For seasonal consumption items
the recall period was 12 months to ensure comparability. The CAPI application automatically
linked the consumption section to the agricultural section so the interviewer could probe carefully
for consumption from home-produced foods. Caeyers, Chalmers, and De Weerdt (2012) discuss
multiple other advantages of CAPI for collecting consumption data. The final consumption aggre-
gate includes purchased and home-produced food, as well as food eaten outside of the household. It
contains 51 food items and 27 non-food items. The aggregates are temporally and spatially deflated
using data from a price questionnaire included in the survey. Consumption is expressed in annual
per capita terms using 2010 Tanzanian shillings.4
3 Quantifying Asymmetry of Information
3.1 Beliefs about assets, education and employment
We can measure the extent to which extended family members are (mis)informed about each other
by cross-checking the beliefs of any household i about educational attainment, employment and
asset ownership of household j with the information in household j’s questionnaire. We can do
this over 8 different items listed in Table 1.5 Household i can underestimate, correctly estimate or
4A full description of the consumption aggregate is available at
http://www.edi-africa.com/research/khds/introduction.htm
5Perceptions of educational attainment and occupation were collected at the individual level, for each original
panel member (people who were member of the baseline household) currently member of j. The perceptions on the
6 asset were asked the j-household level.
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Table 1: Asymmetric information.
Underestimate Spot-on Overestimate DK
Completed O’level 0.029 0.920 0.022 0.029
Has formal job 0.054 0.872 0.008 0.066
Owns house 0.088 0.748 0.095 0.068
Owns land 0.120 0.761 0.048 0.071
Owns livestock 0.059 0.745 0.072 0.123
Owns phone 0.096 0.725 0.075 0.105
Owns TV 0.080 0.720 0.044 0.156
Owns motorized vehic 0.040 0.667 0.142 0.151
Notes: Comparing actual realizations to beliefs held by extended family members. Cells indicate
the proportion of observations. Completed O’level means having completed the first four (out of
six) years of secondary education. N=9,032.
overestimate the status of household j; household i could also answer that it does not know the
educational attainment, employment status or assets owned by household j. Table 1 gives frequen-
cies of these cross-reports and already reveals some interesting patterns. Most underestimates of
assets occur with respect to land and phones, while most overestimates occur with respect to vehi-
cles. Educational attainment and employment have the most correct perceptions. Note, however,
how very few people overestimate the employment position of their relatives, while relatively more
underestimate (i.e. think their family members don’t have a formal job, while in fact they do).
Ultimately, we are interested in measuring what i’s perception on these 8 items tells us about
i’s perception of j’s wealth, and to what extent and in which direction i misperceives j’s true
wealth. A first, rough such summary measure of asymmetry of information could be the simple
sum of perceptions on the 8 items above adding up overestimates (set to +1), underestimates (set
to −1), correct responses (set to 0) and don’t know responses (set to 0). The first panel in Figure
1 shows the distribution of this sum, overlaid with a normal density curve, scaled to have its mean
(−0.57) and standard deviation (1.32). This measure would lead us to conclude that, while there’s
a concentration (44%) of responses at zero, there’s also a slight tendency to underestimate. Some
of the lumping at zero happens because we count don’t know responses as zeros. However, even
on the subsample of observations that do not have any don’t know responses, we still have 41% of
dyads with perfect knowledge on the eight characteristics in Table 1.
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Figure 1: Simple sum of misperceptions (N=9,032)
There are a number of problems with the above simple sum approach. First, it is assumed that
all items carry the same weight in the measure. Second, it is assumed that the weight of each item
is separable from the household’s characteristics, and from other items. Third, it is assumed that
all items signal something positive about the wealth of the individual. An example of a violation of
these last two assumptions would be if livestock ownership signals high income for rural households,
but low income for urban households. In the next section we alleviate these concerns with a novel
measure of asymmetric information: a weighted sum of misperceptions and their interactions, with
weights set according to the correlations of the perceived items with household income.
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3.2 Perceived Consumption and Misperceptions
Let Aj denote the profile of actual ownership of assets, education and occupation for household
j, including any relevant interaction effects among assets and with urban or rural location of the
household. This is the profile over which i expresses beliefs Bij . In addition, let Xj denote a vector
of basic characteristics of household j that we would think are public knowledge among relatives.
Given i’s belief about the profile of ownership of j, what can we infer about i’s estimate of
j’s consumption? The view that we take here is that by observing households around him, i has
learned the joint distribution of ownership profiles Aj and household per capita consumption cj
conditional on household characteristics Xj and Aj .
Hence, we first estimate a consumption regression among our households
ln(cj) = Ajα+Xjβ + ǫj (1)
where cj is the actual per capita consumption for household j. To clarify the exposition we do not
write in equation (1) (and subsequently in equations (2), (3) and (4)) the interaction terms between
Xj and Aj but will include them in practice as (see Section 3.3).
Retrieving the coefficients estimated α and β from (1), we can then use the characteristics Xj
and i’s beliefs about j’s assets Bij to construct measures of i’s perception of j’s consumption. Let
ln(Cij) = Bijα+Xjβ. (2)
How does ln(Cij) relate to i’s beliefs regarding j’s log per capita consumption? The answer to this
question depends on what knowledge i has of the unobservables ǫj in equation (1). We consider two
extreme assumptions regarding i’s knowledge of ǫj and use it to construct two alternative measures
of i’s perception of j’s consumption. One benchmark is to think that households are much better
informed than we are about all unobservable characteristics, including temporary shocks, that
affect the income of their relatives. Hence, at the one end of the spectrum, we can assume that j’s
relatives are perfectly informed of ǫj , in which case i’s perceived consumption for j is
Pij = ln(Cij) + ǫj .
In this case, if household i held perfect knowledge on household j’s assets then the predicted
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consumption would equal the actual consumption.
An alternative benchmark is to posit that household i uses only Xj and her beliefs about j’s
assets Bij in forming her estimate of household j’s per capita consumption Cij . This assumes
that household i has no additional information about household j, over and above Xj , so that i’s
perceived consumption for j is
P ′ij = ln(Cij).
We believe that the truth lies somewhere in between these two estimates.
This method implicitly assumes that any information that i has received about j is captured in
ǫj or in Bij , and therefore does not have an independent effect on i’s perception of j’s consumption.
For example, the transfers that j has given to i or the frequency with which j calls i can provide
information to i regarding j’s wealth. We assume that this information is fully reflected in i’s beliefs
about j’s assets and therefore in i’s perception of j’s consumption. This approach accounts for the
possibility that one could make a number of mistakes regarding a relative’s assets and still have
a fairly accurate estimate of his household per capita consumption. It is entirely possible that a
person, when answering the survey questions about her relatives, reports beliefs on assets that are
consistent with her perception of the relative’s consumption. She might report that her relative has
a TV but no phone, while her relative has a phone but no TV, but if both asset ownership profiles
correspond to similar lifestyle (per capita consumption) in the overall population it amounts to the
same perceived income.
Using these two benchmarks, we can create the following two measures of misperceptions – the
difference between i’s perceived income for j and j’s actual income:
Ωij = Pij − ln(cj) = (Bij −Aj)α, (3)
and
Ω′ij = P
′
ij − ln(cj) = (Bij −Aj)α− ǫj . (4)
Our measure of misperception Ωij is a weighted sum of the difference in believed and actual
occupation, education and assets. As such it is well suited to measure misperceptions of medium-
term income, rather than asymmetry of information regarding temporary shocks. In contrast, Ω′ij
might measure not only misperceptions on medium term income but be also affected by beliefs
regarding temporary shocks, which are part of ǫj . For example, a temporary positive consumption
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shock to j, ǫj > 0, with constant Aj will lower Ω
′
ij – making it more likely for us to conclude that
i underestimates j’s wealth – but will not affect our measurement of Ωij .
The log specification conveniently implies that Ωij is a good approximation of the percentage
by which i overestimates (Ωij > 0) or underestimates (Ωij < 0) j’s consumption.
3.3 Measuring Weights for Perceived Consumption
We populate Xj with variables describing the gender and age of the household head, 8 variables
capturing the age-sex composition of the household and a dummy indicating whether the household
lives in a rural or urban area. These variables, described in Appendix, are assumed common
knowledge.
When predicting household i’s beliefs about household j we need to decide how to treat don’t
know (DK) answers to the assets, educational attainment and employment questions. In these
regressions we take the conservative approach of replacing DKs with location-specific sample means,
depending on whether household j lives in an urban or rural area. We will also control for the
number of don’t know answer in the main regressions in Section 6.1.6
We use a recursive method to establish which variables enter Bij . We start with a regression,
shown in column 1 of Table 13 in Appendix 1, that includes the set of Xj variables and all variables
from Table 1: educational attainment and employment of the panel member (i.e. who belonged to
the origin household, which was interviewed in the 1991-1994 survey), and household ownership of
a house, land, livestock, phone, TV or motorized vehicle.7 The initial regression includes a set of
interaction terms between all of these variables and the urban-rural dummy, to capture location-
specific correlations between assets and wealth. We also interact the two largest and immobile
assets, house and land, with other assets to explore complementarities. The second regression,
shown in the second column of Table 13, retains only those elements of Bij with t > 1.5 and the
third regression in column 3 iterates the same procedure. After 3 iterations all coefficients of Bij
have t > 1.5 – a desirable feature of our final regression, as we want to avoid insignificant variables
6As a robustness check, we also tried two extreme assumptions regarding the 0.5% dyads ij where i answered
don’t know to all belief questions about j: beliefs that 1. maximize and 2. minimize perceived consumption given
the location. Our main results are unaffected.
7These variables are very similar to the ones chosen to predict household poverty levels using Proxy Means Tests
or categorizations of households into ineligible and eligible groups for social assistance based on easy to observe
characteristics when reliable data on income of consumption are not available (see the large literature on PMTs
following Ravallion (1989) and review of targeting in practice by Coady, Grosh, and Hoddinott (2004)).
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influencing the calculation of Ωij . The final weights obtained through the third regression are
reported in Table 2, which also shows the high predictive power of the regression, explaining 58
percent of the variation in consumption.
The final specification highlights the importance of allowing for interaction effects when es-
tablishing the weights. We see, for example, that phone ownership shows less correlation with
wealth in urban areas, while livestock ownership has no correlation with wealth in urban areas.
Vehicle ownership, by contrast, is a stronger predictor of high consumption in urban areas. There
is also a positive and significant interaction effect between house and vehicle ownership. Perhaps
surprisingly, land ownership is dropped in the final regression as it is insignificant in levels and all
interactions.
Applying the weights from Table 2 to Equation (3) and (4), we can calculate Ω and Ω′, for
each i− j pair. Figure 2 shows kernel density estimations for both measures. The mean (standard
deviation) of 0.008 (0.309) for Ω and 0.004 (0.527) for Ω′: on average there is a very slight, 0.4% to
0.8% overestimation of other’s wealth, but there is no indication of any major systematic overesti-
mation or underestimation of wealth. The average of the absolute values of Ω and Ω′ are 0.21 and
0.42, meaning that people are, on average, 20 and 42 per cent mistaken, respectively. The kernel
smoother from Figure 2 obfuscates the fact that Ω equals exactly zero in 27% of dyads, where all
guesses were correct. This is a much lower percentage than what we observed in a simple sum,
where any over and under estimations can cancel each other out exactly. The Ω′ distribution does
not exhibit this lumping at zero because it subtracts the ǫj term in its calculation. For the same
reason the distribution of Ω′ has a much larger spread than that of Ω.
3.4 Validation
We validate Ω and Ω′ by comparing them with a completely different measure of asymmetric
information. For each of its network partners, any household i was asked to imagine a nine-step
ladder where the top of the ladder, step 9, represents the best possible life and the bottom, step
1, represents the worst possible life. Household i was then asked to rank each household j in
his network on the ladder. In Table 3, we show that, using household i fixed effects, the higher
household i places household j on the ladder, controlling for household j’s actual consumption, the
higher Ωij and Ω
′
ij are. In other words, for 2 relatives with the same actual consumption household
i’s misperception of their wealth is highly correlated with where he differentially places each on
12
Table 2: Weights in Ω
Coefficient
HH located in urban area 0.261***
(6.773)
Panel member finished O level 0.230***
(8.041)
Panel member has a formal job 0.187***
(5.771)
Owns house -0.090***
(-3.994)
Owns livestock 0.148***
(4.979)
Owns phone 0.332***
(15.482)
Owns TV, video equipment or camera 0.331***
(12.703)
Owns motorbike, car, truck or other vehicle 0.145*
(1.715)
Owns house * owns vehicle 0.245***
(3.117)
Urban * owns livestock -0.134**
(-2.087)
Urban * owns phone -0.123***
(-2.751)
Urban * owns vehicle 0.156**
(2.512)
Adjusted R-squared 0.572
N 3173
Notes: Final weights in Ω determined through recursive estimation of Equation (3). All iterations
are given in Table 13 in Appendix 1. t statistics between brackets under the coefficient. * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
the ladder. The strong correlations between our misperception measures and these subjective
perceptions give confidence that Ω and Ω′ are indeed capturing latent beliefs and are not merely
noise. In Section 4 we will further validate our misperception measures by verifying how they co-vary
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Figure 2: Distribution of Ω and Ω′ (N=9,032)
with variables that measure the fluidity of information flows between the two nodes. Finally, when
testing the model in Section 6 we will use the ladder as an alternative measure of misperceptions
to verify the robustness of the results.
4 Description of Misperceptions
4.1 Proximity and Misperception
It is very natural to expect individuals who are closer to each other, physically or socially, to have
better information about each other. Table 4 relates misperceptions to a number of proximity
variables through probit regressions. In the first column, the dependent variable is whether Ωij is
zero, which requires that all the beliefs of i regarding j are correct and occurs in 27% of all dyads.
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Table 3: Comparing Ω to subjective perceptions.
Ωij Ω
′
ij
i places j on bottom 3 rungs of 9-step ladder -0.071*** -0.113***
(-7.103) (-9.200)
i places j on top 3 rungs of 9-step ladder 0.107*** 0.238***
(5.383) (9.692)
i gives DK answer to ladder question regarding j -0.059*** -0.038**
(-4.202) (-2.197)
log of j’s actual consumption per capita -0.128*** -0.569***
(-21.895) (-79.089)
Constant 1.727*** 7.547***
(22.258) (79.027)
N 9032 9032
Notes: Household i fixed effect regression of Ω and Ω′ on 3 ladder dummies indicating where household i
places household j on a 9-step ladder.
In the second column, the dummy is whether Ω′ij , which is never exactly zero, is close to 0 in the
sense that it falls in [−0.5σ,+0.5σ] where σ is the standard deviation of Ω′ (39% of all dyads).
In line with our expectations we see that the accuracy of perceptions, and in particular as
measured by Ωij , increases with proximity variables such as kilometers of geographic distance
between the households, whether a parent-child link exists across the two households, whether they
communicated in the past 2 years and whether they recently shared a meal together. We also
see that there is less accurate information about extended family members living in urban areas,
controlling for distance travelled.
The results also give further credence to our measures of information asymmetry by showing
that they correlate as expected with some key variables and are not just capturing noise. In what
follows we will report all results for both Ω and Ω′.
4.2 Perceptions within and across groups
Next, we ask whether there is any evidence of systematic perception errors within or across specific
groups. We start by defining the poor as those falling in the lowest per capita consumption quartile
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Table 4: Correct expectations and distance.
Ωij = 0 Ω
′
ij ≈ 0
Distance between HHs (100 km) -0.0169*** -0.0029*
(-10.461) (-1.768)
j located in urban area -0.0687*** -0.0088
(-6.862) (-0.776)
Parent-child link 0.0414*** 0.0183
(3.218) (1.304)
i and j communicated in the past 2 years 0.1529*** -0.0234
(13.858) (-1.566)
Number of years since i and j last lived together -0.0007 0.0008
(-0.763) (0.750)
Shared at least one meal in the past month 0.0495*** 0.0347**
(3.196) (2.023)
N 9032 9032
Percent of observations with LHS = 1 27% 39%
Notes: Probit regressions of correct expectations. Marginal effect reported. t statistics in brackets under the
coefficient. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Regressions include an indicator variable for 36 missing
km distance observations.
and the rich as those falling in the highest quartile. The full line in the first panel of Figure 3
shows the perceptions of the poor about extended family members that are also poor. This can
be compared to the dashed line which are the perceptions of the poor about their rich extended
family members. The second panel takes the perspective of the rich and shows their perception
of the poor versus the other rich. These within and across group perceptions show that the best
information is by the poor about the other poor. The rich have much worse information about the
poor compared to the poor themselves (judging by the lower peak at zero), but still slightly better
on the poor than on other rich people. The omega distributions about the rich lie to the left of
those about the poor, irrespective of whose perspective we take. This could simply be a reflection
of uncertainty about the wealth levels, making it more likely to underestimate a rich person and
overestimate a poor person.
Next, we split the population up by two characteristics that we can plausibly assume to be
known within extended family networks: whether a household migrated or not and whether they
live in an urban or a rural area. In Figure 4 we look at the perceptions of non-migrants (people still
living in the baseline village or a neighboring village) about migrants versus other non-migrants
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Figure 3: Kernel density functions of Ω, perceptions by wealth status (N=9,032).
(first panel) and perceptions of migrants about family members who remained at home versus other
migrants in the network. Figure 5 does the same for urban versus rural dwellers.8
Systematic under or over estimation across whole groups, delineated by a known characteristic,
is less readily explained. Finding systematic shifts to the left or right in the mass of the distribution
of Ω in Figure 4 or 5 could be evidence of mass deception by migrants or urban dwellers about
their actual asset holdings. Indeed, a number of recent studies suggest that migrants might want
to underreport their income to avoid sending remittances (see McKenzie, Gibson, and Stillman
(2012), Jakiela and Ozier (2015), Ambler (2015) and Seshan and Zubrickas (2015)). The question
is whether this deception could be sustained. One might expect individuals to anticipate such
dissimulation and to have correct expectations on average.
8It is useful to remember here that, as noted in the data section, the questionnaire skipped the cross-reports when
people were living in the same location. That means, for example, that the non-migrants reports about each other
are not from people living in the same village, but rather from network members in neighboring villages
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Figure 4: Kernel density functions of Ω, perceptions by migration status (N=9,032).
Figure 4 shows that there is no major systematic underestimate nor overestimate of migrants’
wealth: Ω is centered around 0 in the sense that the median of all these distributions is 0. Still, these
distributions have different shapes on either sides of the 0-center with non-migrants underestimating
migrants by about 1.8% on average and migrants overestimating the wealth of non-migrants by
about 5.2% on average. These differences are small, but consistent with McKenzie, Gibson, and
Stillman (2012) who find that prospective migrants from Tonga under-estimate their potential
earnings in New-Zealand, and especially so if they have relatives who migrated to New Zealand
(suggesting that they probably underestimate the earnings of their relatives), and with Seror (2012)
who finds that Senegalese migrants have substantial asymmetry of information regarding the asset
holding of their family members.
A more pronounced difference is that non-migrants have the best information about each other,
as evidenced by the high peak in the solid line of panel A in figure 4. Also migrants have better
information about non-migrants than they do about other migrants, but the difference is smaller.
Figure 5 shows that rural dwellers have much better information on other rural dwellers, compared
to urban dwellers. A thinner spread could reflect better knowledge about circumstances and/or
reflect a lower actual spread of asset-wealth. For example, there could be more accurate knowledge
about the life of non-migrants as they have remained living in the place where migrants originate
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Figure 5: Kernel density functions of Ω, perceptions by location (N=9,032).
from too. Or non-migrants actual asset-wealth may display a lot less variation.
5 Model of Misperceptions and Transfers
In this Section, we present simple static models relating income, misperceptions of income and
transfers. In a static model, there are three possible motivations for transfers: altruism, exchange
and pressure. These are incorporated in the model below. We show that these motives have
different predictions regarding the correlation between income, misperceptions and transfers.
The static nature of the model follows from the static nature of our data and the fact that
misperceptions are asset based. To be sure, asymmetry of information regarding short term shocks
and the resulting dynamic effects in transfers may also be present,9 but would be difficult to study
in this context.
Preferences and Income:
Consider two individuals, a recipient R and a donor D. A first possible motive for transfers is
9See Cole and Kocherlakota (1999), Attanasio and Pavoni (2011) and Hauser and Hopenhayn (2008) among others.
altruism: the donor potentially cares not only about her own utility of consumption, but also about
the recipient’s. Denote by ui(c) the utility of consumption of i ∈ {R,D}, with the usual properties
that u′ > 0 and u′′ < 0, and denote by αD ∈ [0, 1) D’s altruism, that is the weight that the donor
puts on the recipient’s utility of consumption (following Becker (1974)).10.
The recipient R and donor D’s utilities are then vR = uR(cR) and
vD = uD(cD) + αDEDuR(c˜R) (5)
where c˜R is R’s consumption as perceived by D. Note that we could easily assume that the recipient
is also altruistic towards the donor.
Income and Information:
We assume that R and D’s actual incomes are private information, though the following income
distributions are common knowledge. The donor D’s income y is either low (L) with a probability
1− qD or high (H) with a probability qD, L < H and qD ∈ (0, 1). The recipient R’s income x takes
a low value (ℓ) with probability 1− qR or a high value (h) otherwise, ℓ < h and qR ∈ (0, 1).
Let i ∈ {R,D} be one party and j 6= i ∈ {R,D} be the other. Individual i’s beliefs about
j’s income are based on j’s actual probability of having a high income, but will also reflect any
information about the actual realization of j’s income that i receives. Assume that i receives a signal
sj ∈ (0, 1) about j’s income m drawn from the conditional distribution fj(s|m). The realization
of the signals is common knowledge. We assume that the conditional distributions satisfy the
monotonic likelihood property, so that high values of the signal are relatively more likely when
income is higher, but also that at the extreme, these signals are almost perfectly informative:
[S1] fR(s|h)
fR(s|ℓ)
and fD(s|H)
fD(s|L)
are strictly increasing in s,
[S2] lims↑1
fR(s|ℓ)
fR(s|h)
= lims↑1
fD(s|L)
fD(s|H)
= 0 and lims↓0
fR(s|h)
fR(s|ℓ)
= lims↓0
fD(s|H)
fD(s|L)
= 0.
After using the signals and Bayes rule to update their beliefs, the posterior beliefs that the
recipient and the donor hold about each other are given by
πRsR =
qRfR(sR|h)
qRfR(sR|h) + (1− qR)fR(sR|ℓ)
and
πDsD =
qDfD(sD|H)
qDfD(sD|H) + (1− qD)fD(sD|L)
,
10See also Stark (1995).
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where πjs is the probability that i assigns to j having a high income after observing signal s.
Pressure: Although more rarely studied, pressure seems to be an important determinant of
transfers. There is a large literature describing the pressure under which many households in
developing countries find themselves to assist relatives (see Chort, Gubert, and Senne (2012) and
Platteau (2012) among others). Individuals may be able to shame relatives who fail in helping them
in times of known need, or make them feel guilty. Alternatively recipients could use their community
to exert this pressure and retaliate against relatives who fail to transfer enough. Pressure can also
be through a loss of social status if one fails to transfer enough. This pressure might be available to
recipients only at certain times, for instance when the recipient has a well known need (she suffers
an observable shock, the school fees are due, etc ).
To model this pressure motive, we assume thatR can commit on imposing a utility cost p ∈ [0, P ]
onto D.
Exchange: Finally, another possible motive for transfers, in particular for migrants, is quid-
pro-quo. As discussed by Cox and Fafchamps (2008) and Rapoport and Docquier (2006), private
transfers might be given in exchange for goods or services provided by the recipient. This could
be help with young children, old-age support or maintaining property rights for migrants. Assume
that, at times, the recipient is in position to provide a service of utility value v to the donor at a
utility cost c.
Altruism
Consider first a situation in which altruism is driving the transfers: αD > 0, P = 0 and v = 0. The
recipient R has no credible way to signal her income. Hence, for a given realization of her income
y and the signal sR = s, D chooses to make a transfer t to R that maximizes
uD(y − t) + αD[π
R
s uR(h+ t) + (1− π
R
s )uR(ℓ+ t)]. (6)
D’s choice of transfer t∗ clearly depends on his own income as well as on his posterior beliefs
regarding R’s income: a positive transfer t∗ is strictly increasing in y and decreasing in πRs . Hence,
the altruism model predicts a positive correlation between transfers and the donor’s actual income,
and a negative correlation between transfers and the donor’s perception of the recipient’s income.
The latter implies a negative correlation between transfers and the donor’s misperception of the
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recipient income controlling for the actual income and a negative correlation between transfers and
the recipient’s income controlling for the donor’s misperception.
Since there is a one-to-one correspondence between the donor’s income and the transfer that
she chooses when a positive transfer is made, upon receiving a transfer from D, R would know
D’s realized income. Hence, no correlation is predicted between the transfers and the recipient’s
misperception of the donor’s income.11
Note that the same predictions would apply if the recipient was also altruistic towards the
donor, although an interesting signalling game among donors would arise in this case as shown in
Genicot (2014).
Pressure
Now, let’s study the case without altruism αD = 0 and without services v = 0, but in which
transfers are driven by the possibility of pressure: P > 0. Since the cost for D of making a given
transfer is decreasing in her income, R can make use of pressure not only to receive a transfer but
also to get D to reveal her real income.
Indeed, given his income x, R offers a menu to D of transfers t and contingent pressure p(t):
− a transfer of TH or more implies no pressure;
− a transfer of TL implies pressure p; and
− any other transfer is associated with pressure p.
The offer is designed so that the donor chooses to give TH and face no pressure when her income
is high, while she chooses to give TL and face pressure p when her income is low.
Incentive constraints: To simplify notation, denote by Vy(T ) D’s utility if her income is y and
she makes a transfer T :
Vy(T ) = uD(y − T ). (7)
11If the degree of altruism of the donor was not known to the recipient, then there could be a positive correlation
between the transfers and the recipient’s misperception of the donor’s income controlling for the donor’s income.
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The incentive constraints for both type H and type L to comply with the offered menu are
VH(TH) ≥ max
t
{VH(t)− p(t)} (8)
VL(TL)− p ≥ max
t
{VL(t)− p(t)} (9)
where p(t) is the pressure triggered by the scheme. Clearly, in the absence of altruism, D’s preferred
transfer to R would be 0 while R would like to receive as much as possible. Hence, R uses the
highest pressure as a threat p = P and, if D has a low income, her preferred deviation would be to
make no transfer.
It follows that the incentive constraint for type L in (9) becomes,
VL(TL)− p ≥ VL(0)− P. (10)
Now, for type H, the relevant constraint ensures that H does not want to pretend to be L:12
VH(TH) ≥ VH(TL)− p. (11)
Given his income x and the signal s received, the recipient R chooses p, TH and TL to maximize
πDs uR(x+ TH) + (1− π
D
s )uR(x+ TL) (12)
subject to (10) and (11).
The following two types of offer (or contracts) are possible:
Pooling: R asks D to transfer an amount tp and no pressure is effectively applied p = 0, otherwise
the maximal pressure p = P is applied. Hence, D makes the same transfer irrespective of her
income TL = TH = t
p. Beliefs are therefore not updated and R never learns D’s real income. The
transfer tp is such that a type L donor is indifferent between giving tp and receiving the maximum
amount of pressure, i.e. uD(L− t
p) = uD(L)− P .
or
Separating: R demands from D either a transfer of TH in exchange for no pressure, or a lower
transfer TL(< TH) but with some pressure p > 0. Any other transfer would result in maximal
12As usual, (10) and (11) imply that VH(TH) − p ≥ VH(0) − P . This is shown in Appendix 2.
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pressure. D chooses to transfer more when her income is high TH > TL but he is subject to
pressure p > 0 when her income (and transfer) is lower. Since D’s transfer varies with her income,
R updates his beliefs and has full information ex-post. The exact values TH , TL and p depend on
the probabilities πDs and on x.
Naturally, R is more likely to offer a separating contract when he receives a signal sD that makes
it more likely that D has a high income. This intuition is formalized in the following Proposition
whose proof is in Appendix 2.
Proposition 1 There is a cutoff value of the signal s˜ ∈ (0, 1) such that R offers a pooling contract
if sD ≤ s˜ and R offers a separating contract if sD > s˜ with TH (TL) increasing (decreasing) in s
Proposition 1 tells us that if the donor’s actual income is low, either
(i) sD > s˜ and R offers a separating contract, in which case D gives a low transfer and is subject
to pressure and R’s beliefs are correct ex-post; or
(ii) sD ≤ s˜ and R offers a pooling contract with transfer tp > TL, in which case R overestimates
D’s income ex-post.
Similarly, if the donor’s actual income is high, either
(i) sD > s˜ : R offers a separating contract, in which case D gives a high transfer and R’s beliefs
are correct ex-post; or
(ii) sD ≤ s˜: R offers a pooling contract with transfer tp < TH , in which case R underestimates D’s
income ex-post.
Table 7 illustrates these findings. First, there is a positive correlation between D’s actual
income and her transfer to R. Second, for a given income level of D (H or L) there exists a positive
correlation between the perception of D’s income by R (πD) and the transfer from D to R: the
more R thinks D has, the higher the transfer from D to R is. Because these are ex-post beliefs, this
correlation takes into account the feedback mechanism through which transfers influence beliefs.
In terms of the recipient’s income, whether a higher x affects the contract offered and, if so,
whether it encourages separating or pooling depends on the utility function. If the recipient utility
function exhibits diminishing risk aversion then the recipient may be more likely to offer a separating
contract when his income is high (s˜ decreases) and, for any given signal sD above the threshold,
R may ask a higher TH and a lower TL when his income is high. Since a higher spread between
TL and TH would be associated with a higher mean transfer, this would imply a small positive
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Table 5: Summary of the Pressure Model
D’s income Signal Contract to D Transfers to R* ΩRD
L sD > s˜ separating low (TL) = 0 (correct)
sD ≤ s˜ pooling medium (tp) > 0 (overestimate)
H sD > s˜ separating high (TH) = 0 (correct)
sD ≤ s˜ pooling medium (t
p) < 0 (underestimate)
∗ TL < t
p < TH
correlation between the transfers and the recipient’s income.
Controlling for the recipient’s income, and therefore the actual offer, any variation in the donor’s
ex-post beliefs about the recipient changes stems from receiving different signals under a pooling
offer. This has no bearing on transfers so that, controlling for the incomes there is no correlation
between transfers and the donor’s perceptions of the recipient’s income.
Exchange
To study the exchange motive, assume that there is no pressure (P = 0) nor altruism (αD = 0),
but that the recipient can provide a service of utility value v to the donor at a utility cost c, c < v.
The price of that service, the transfer, clearly depends on their relative bargaining power.
Denote as t(x), the lowest transfer that the recipient would accept to provide the service, given
his income x:
uR(x+ t(x))− uR(x) = c, (13)
and as t(y), the highest transfer that the donor would pay for the service, given her income y:
uD(y)− uD(y − t(y)) = v. (14)
We assume that the relative value of the service (v/c) is sufficient such that the exchange is
socially optimal: t(L) > t(h). We follow Cox and Fafchamps (2008) and Rapoport and Docquier
(2006) and consider in turn the two extremes: the case where the donor has all the bargaining
power and the case where the recipient has all the bargaining power.
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Exchange-D: Donor has the bargaining power
Assume that D gets to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to R. This recipient’s reservation price t(x)
is clearly increasing in his income x. Hence, D essentially chooses between a) offering t(h) for the
service, an offer that R always accepts, or b) offering a lower transfer t(ℓ) that R accepts only when
his income is low. Other offers are dominated. The optimal choice depends on D’s income y and
her beliefs regarding R’s income πRs . D chooses a) if
uD(y − t(h)) + v ≥ π
R
s uD(y) + (1− π
R
s )(uD(y − t(ℓ)) + v)⇔
v ≥ [uD(y)− uD(y − t(h))] +
1− πRs
πRs
[uD(y − t(ℓ))− uD(y − t(h))], (15)
and chooses b) otherwise. Higher πRs makes this inequality more likely to hold. For low values of
the signal sR, πRs is close to 0 and inequality (15) cannot hold, while for high values of the signal
sR, πRs is close to 1 and (15) is necessarily satisfied.
Proposition 2 There is a cutoff value of the signal s ∈ (0, 1) such that D offers t(ℓ) if sR ≤ s and
D offers t(h) if sR > s.
D offers t(ℓ) when she receives a signal that the recipient’s income is likely to be low (sR ≤ s),
and she offers t(h) when the signal indicates that recipient’s income is likely to be high sR > s.
Controlling for D’s perception of R’s income, the actual transfer is negatively correlated with R’s
actual income. And controlling for the actual realization of R’s income (x), the correlation between
the transfer and D’s perception of R’s income (πR) is ambiguous: it depends on the value of x,
positive for low values of x and negative for high values of x.
Table 6: Summary of Exchange-D scenario [3]
R’s income Signal Offer to R Transfers to R* ΩDR
ℓ sR > s t(h) t(h) > 0 (overestimate)
sR ≤ s t(ℓ) t(ℓ) = 0 (correct)
h sR > s t(h) t(h) < 0 (underestimate)
sR ≤ s t(ℓ) 0 = 0 (correct)
What about the donor’s income y? A higher income makes inequality (15) more likely to hold.
Richer donors are more likely to offer the high price t(h) so that the threshold s is smaller for richer
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donor. This implies a positive correlation between the transfers and the donor’s income. These
correlations come only from the realization of the signal that reveals y’s income: the realizations
of the signal sR that lies between the threshold s for y = H and the threshold s for y = L and
so are likely to be small. Controlling for the actual income of the donor, only the signal that the
recipient receives affects her beliefs about the donor’s income so that there is no correlation with
the transfers.
Exchange-R: Recipient has the bargaining power
Now, assume that the recipient gets to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the donor. It is easy to
check that the donor’s reservation price t(y) too is increasing in her income. Hence, R essentially
chooses between two options: a) demanding t(L) for the service, an offer that D always accepts,
or b) demanding a higher transfer t(H) that D rejects when her income is low but accepts when
her income is high. Other demands would be dominated by one of these two options. R’s chosen
option depends on his income x and his beliefs about D’s income πDs . R chooses a) if
uR(x+ t(L))− c ≥ π
D
s (uR(x+ t(H))− c) + (1− π
D
s )uR(x)⇔
[uR(x+ t(L))− uR(x)]− c ≥
πDs
1− πDs
[uR(x+ t(H))− uR(x+ t(L))], (16)
and chooses b) otherwise. The higher πDs is the more likely R is to ask t(H). Again we can see
that when πDs is close to 0, inequality (16) is satisfied while it fails for value of π
D
s close to 1.
Proposition 3 There is a cutoff value of the signal s∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that R asks t(L) if sD ≤ s
∗
and R asks t(H) if sD > s
∗.
R asks t(L) when he receives a signal that the donor’s income is likely to be low, and he offers
t(H) when the signal indicates that donor’s income is likely to be high. Controlling for D’s income
(y), the transfer is positively correlated with R’s perception of D’s income (πDs ) and, controlling
for R’s perception of D’s income, the transfer is positively correlated with D’s income.
Again, there will be a correlation between the recipient’s income x and the transfers only if it
affects the scenario that he chooses. As a higher income for the recipient could make him more
or less likely to select a) depending on the values of t(L) and t(H) and his utility function, this
correlation, if there is one, should be small and could go in any direction.
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Table 7: Summary of Exchange-R scenario [3]
D’s income Signal Demand to D Transfers to R* ΩRD
L sD > s∗ t(H) 0 = 0 (correct)
sD ≤ s∗ t(L) t(L) > 0 (overestimate)
H sD > s∗ t(H) t(H) = 0 (correct)
sD ≤ s∗ t(L) t(L) < 0 (underestimate)
Controlling for the recipient’s actual income x, only the signal about it received by the donor
cause variation in her beliefs about the recipient’s income and this is uncorrelated with the transfers.
Predictions
Table 8 summarizes the predictions of the altruism, pressure and exchange models for our empirical
section.
Note that we recognize that in the data some misperceptions are due to measurement er-
rors/noise. Hence, when the model predicts no misperception at all and therefore no correlation
could be calculated, we enter 0. If the misperceptions are just due to noise then one would expect
a zero correlation.
Table 8 presents the predicted partial correlation between the transfers and the donor’s and
recipient’s income and misperception. That is, it shows the predicted correlations between the
transfers and the donor’s (recipient’s) misperception controlling for the income realizations and the
other’s misperception, and the predicted partial correlation between the transfers and the donor’s
(recipient’s) income controlling for the misperceptions and the other’s income. These correspond
to the predictions regarding the regression coefficients in the next section.
As discussed earlier, in that in the pressure and exchange-R models the partial correlation
between the transfers and R’s income are likely to be small as it exists only when the type of
contract chosen by R changes with his income, and in addition the overall effect averages some
positive and negative effects13. Hence, we enter ǫ in Table 8 for these effects that expect to be
negligible.
13Under decreasing risk aversion, though small the overall effect would be positive under the pressure model but
ambiguous in the exchange-R model
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Table 8: Predictions
Partial correlation between transfer and: ΩRD ΩDR D’s income R’s income
Model
Altruism 0 − + −
Pressure + 0 + ǫ+
Exchange-D t(l) or t(h) 0 A + −
Exchange-R t(L) /t(H) + 0 + ǫ
Notes: A= ambiguous ; ǫ+ small non negative effect ; ǫ small ambiguous effect.
If the opportunity presents itself, households might hide some of their wealth. 14 Access
to a hiding technology would result in an increase in the precision of a high signal and reduce
the prediction of a low signal. Hence, the existence of a (partial) hiding technology would not
affect our main predictions, though it would attenuate some of the effects. Similarly, access to a
costly monitoring (see de Laat (2014) for evidence of split household members engaging in costly
monitoring) would not affect the predicted correlations.
6 Asymmetric information and transfers
6.1 Main results
The survey collected data on amounts remitted, both in kind and cash. Over two thirds of house-
holds in our sample report remitting in cash or kind in the year preceding the survey. The average
amount remitted, among those who did, was USD 35, representing, on average, 7% of consumption
per capita and 2% of total household consumption for the remitting households. That average masks
a wide distribution, with the top decile remitting USD 160, signifying 25% of their consumption
per capita and 8% of their total household consumption.
Out of these transfers, 59% goes to recipients within the extended family network. For these
within-network transfers we have full interview data on both the recipient and the donor, including
the perceptions they have of each other and the degree to which these perceptions deviate from
the truth. This allows us to test the predictions from Table 8 regarding the partial correlations
between transfers (TRD) received by any household R in the family network from any other family
14Recent experiments have shown that, even within households, individuals take advantage of hiding technologies
Castilla and Walker (2013) and Ashraf (2009).
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D in the same network and (i) the degree of misperceptions of the recipient about the donor (ΩRD
or Ω′RD), (ii) the degree of misperceptions of the donor about the recipient (ΩDR or Ω
′
DR), (iii) the
donor’s income (ID) and (iv) (iii) the recipient’s income (IR), with both income variables proxied
by log consumption per capita.
We estimate these partial correlations through dyadic regressions of TRD, whether or not D
reported giving transfers to R in the year preceding the survey,15 on the four correlates we are
interested in. This brings with it a number of econometric challenges. The first is that we need
to condition the correlations on the correct variables in order to get unbiased estimates. In the
model we assume everything constant across both donor and recipient. We can implement this
empirically by using a two-way fixed effect model, which includes a fixed effect for R and D, αR
and αD, respectively.
16 Of course this does not capture any dyadic specific heterogeneity that may
cloud these correlations. However, we also control for a set of observable dyadic characteristics
describing the relationship between donor and recipient households to minimize such concerns.
The second econometric issue we address is to allow for correlations between transfers received
by the same recipient or sent by the same donor, which would otherwise lead to biased estimates
of the standard errors. To correct for this we use, in our preferred specification, the non-nested
two-way clustering approach developed by Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2011) and implemented
in Stata by Baum, Shaffer, and Stillman (2007).17 Later on we test for robustness when allowing
all transfers to be correlated within extended family networks and find very similar results.
Our preferred regression then is
TRD = β1ΩRD + β2ΩDR +PRDγ1 + αR + αD + ǫRD, (17)
where ǫRD is an error term and PRD is a vector of variables describing the relationship between the
R-D household pair. This includes whether the heads of both households have the same religion,
are from the same tribe, the geographic distance between the two households, whether a parent-
child relationship exists between the two households and the number of don’t know responses to
the asymmetric information questions each side of the dyad gave. Standard errors are two-way
cluster-robust, with clustering on both R and D.
1525% of dyads have TRD = 1
16These models have been discussed by Mittag (2012), with De Weerdt (2004) providing an early application of
two-way fixed effects in dyadic regressions for network analysis.
17An alternative method is provided by Fafchamps and Gubert (2007)
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One of the variables of interest from the model predictions in Table 8 is the donor’s income ID,
which is subsumed in the fixed effect αD. In order to retrieve an estimate of the coefficient of ID
we drop αD in Equation (17) and replace it with D’s income and other characteristics. That is, we
estimate:
TRD = β1ΩRD + β2ΩDR + β3ID +PRDγ1 + ZDγ2 + αR + ǫRD, (18)
where ZD is a vector of household D characteristics, which includes the sex, age and years of
education of the head of the donor’s household as well as the number of household members that
fall in each of eight exclusive and exhaustive age-sex categories (these together also control for
household size).
Similarly, to retrieve an estimate on the IR variable we drop αR in Equation (17) and replace
it with R’s income and other characteristics:
TRD = β1ΩRD + β2ΩDR + β4IR +PRDγ1 + ZRγ2 + αD + ǫRD. (19)
It is worth recalling that we do not attach a causal interpretation to these coefficients. In fact the
model explicitly allows for feedback mechanisms between the level of transfers and perceptions. For
example, in a separating equilibrium, a high TRD will cause beliefs ΩRD to be revised upwards. We
use the dyadic regression set-up as a convenient way to retrieve the partial correlations, measured
by β1, β2, β3 and β4, in order to compare their signs to the predictions from Table 8.
We estimate Equations (18) and (19) separately for both Ω and Ω′. Equation (17) is only
reported for Ω, since, as can be seen from Equations (3) and (4) above, the difference between Ω
and Ω′ is subsumed in the double fixed effect and, in consequence, the regression results for both
measures are identical. All equations are estimated using linear probability models.
The picture that emerges from this table is clearly that β1 > 0, β2 = 0, β3 > 0 and β4 = 0, which
is consistent with either pressure or exchange-R in Table 8. The absence of a negative coefficient
on the the recipient’s income, β4, allows us to reject both altruism and exchange-D as motives of
transfers. We can also reject the hypothesis that β2, the coefficient on ΩDR, is smaller than zero,
thus rejecting a second prediction of the altruism model.
The absence of negative correlation between transfers and the recipient’s income is consistent
with the finding of Lucas and Stark (1985) and Cox, Eser, and Jimenez (1998) who reject altruism
as a motive for remittances among migrants in Botswana and as a motive for transfers in Peru. In
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Table 9: Main Results, Partial correlations with transfers: Ω and income
Equation
(17) (18) (19) (18) (19)
ΩRD 0.088** 0.043** 0.053***
(2.23) (2.44) (2.70)
ΩDR 0.004 0.036 0.008
(0.09) (1.60) (0.54)
Ω′RD 0.094*** 0.052***
(4.77) (2.68)
Ω′DR 0.035 0.004
(1.58) (0.26)
ID 0.090*** 0.160***
(7.53) (8.27)
IR 0.007 0.009
(0.72) (0.57)
R2 0.72 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.08
N 9032 9032 9032 9032 9032
Notes: Fixed Effect Linear probability models with t values in parentheses under the coefficient. *
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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contrast, Kazianga (2006) finds some support for the altruistic motive among the middle income
class in Burkina Faso, but not for low income levels, and in the US, Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotlikoff
(1997) finds a negative correlation between in-vivo transfers and the recipient’s income in support
of the altruism remittance motive.
We can check that our findings are unaltered if we use different measures of the perceptions
of income, coming from the ladder questions described in Section 3.4. We run slightly different
versions of Equations (17), (18) and (19), where we include a measure for whether i places j on the
lowest steps 1, 2 or 3 of the ladder, Lij , or the highest steps 7, 8, 9 of the ladder, Lij . Furthermore,
the variables measuring the number of don’t know responses to asymmetric information questions
are replaced by two dummy variables indicating that don’t know responses were given to the
ladder questions by the donor or the recipient, respectively. The two way fixed-effects version then
becomes:
TRD = δ1LRD + δ2LRD + δ3LDR + δ4LDR +PRDγ1 + αR + αD + ǫRD, (20)
with cluster-robust standard errors, with clustering on both R and D. Note that these FE spec-
ifications allow us to capture any fixed unobserved characteristic of the recipient or of the donor,
which may systematically affect their relative perceptions of the positions of other households in
their family network.
As above, to retrieve estimates of the coefficients on ID and IR, we estimate
TRD = δ1LRD + δ2LRD + δ3LDR + δ4LDR +PRDγ1 + β3ID + ZDγ2 + αR + ǫRD (21)
and
TRD = δ1LRD + δ2LRD + δ3LDR + δ4LDR +PRDγ1 + β4IR + ZRγ2 + αD + ǫRD (22)
respectively.
Table 10 shows the estimates of these three equations. To be consistent with the results in
Section 6.1, we would expect to see that, controlling for D’s actual consumption (through either
αD or ID), lower perceptions of R aboutD’s wealth are correlated with a lower likelihood of transfers
from D to R, which implies δ1 < 0 and, symmetrically, that higher perceptions of R about D’s
wealth are correlated with a higher likelihood of transfers from D to R, that is δ2 > 0. Similarly
as before, we expect , δ3 = 0, δ4 = 0, β3 > 0 and β4 = 0. Table 10 does indeed yield this pattern,
except for the estimated coefficients δ2 which turn out to be largely not significantly different from
zero at conventional levels. This anomaly could be attributed to the fact that this category holds
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Table 10: Partial correlations with transfers: ladder and income
Equation
(20) (21) (22)
R places D low on ladder (LRD) -0.026* -0.051*** -0.015*
(-1.72) (-4.57) (-1.71)
R places D high on ladder (LRD) -0.032 0.025 -0.019
(-1.01) (1.01) (-0.95)
D places R low on ladder (LDR) 0.001 0.017 0.005
(0.04) (1.60) (0.51)
D places R high on ladder (LDR) -0.041 -0.017 -0.032
(-1.19) (-0.73) (-1.45)
ID 0.078***
(7.75)
IR 0.004
(0.50)
R2 0.64 0.09 0.08
Notes: Fixed Effect Linear probability models with t values in parentheses under the coefficient. *
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. N = 13, 808.
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only 5% of the observations, but expanding the boundaries does not make a difference. All in all,
we take these results as confirming the main results indicating that the power in the gift-giving
relationship lies with the recipient of the transfer, consistent with either a pressure model or an
exchange model in which the recipient holds the bargaining power.
6.2 Robustness checks using linear probability models
We now discuss four robustness checks of Equations (17), (18) and (19). Results are presented in
Appendix 4.
First, the regressions presented so far use information on transfers remitted to a recipient, as
reported by the donor. In our data all transfers between two households are reported by both
parties. Table 16 takes advantage of this feature to check that results are robust to using the
recipient’s report instead of the donor’s report.
Second, in Table 17 we check for robustness to changing the level of clustering. We replace the
two-way clustering with clustering at the level of the extended family network.
Third, one may worry about spurious correlations between transfers and incomes since transfers
out are not consumed by the donor (diminishing her income, as proxied by total consumption) and
transfers in may contribute to the consumption of the recipient. Even though we do not know what
the counterfactual consumptions would be in the absence of transfers, we deal with this to some
extent in Table 18 by subtracting transfers from the recipient’s consumption and adding transfers
to the donor’s consumption to build proxies for pre-transfer income.
Fourth, while we have information on ladder estimates for people living in the same location,
we do not have information on their assets and therefore no Ω estimate. One way to deal with this
would be to assume perfect information for these dyads and place their Ω values to 0. The results
of this exercise are given in Table 19.
The results from these robustness checks are in line with our main results. The only difference
is that in some specifications with either the Recipient Fixed Effect or the Donor Fixed Effect, the
coefficient on ΩDR becomes positive and weakly significant. However, our preferred specification to
estimate the coefficients of ΩDR and ΩRD is the two-way fixed effects model of Equation 17, while
our estimates for ID and IR come from the recipient’s fixed effects model in Equation 18 and the
donor’s fixed effects model in Equation 19, respectively. Accordingly, all of the robustness checks
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yield coefficients from the preferred regressions that are consistent with the main results.
6.3 Robustness to discrete choice modeling
One shortcoming of the LPM model is that it makes extreme assumptions on the distributions
of the error terms, which are likely to be violated in the case of a discrete outcome. To check for
robustness we first use the conditional logit model of Chamberlain (1980), which provides consistent
Fixed Effect estimators of the parameters β1, β2, β3 and β4 displayed in equations (18) and (19)
when the outcome considered is discrete.
The results presented in columns (1) and (2) for Ω and in columns (5) and (6) for Ω′ of Table
11 are qualitatively very similar to our main results in Table 9, which is reassuring.
Table 11: Discrete Choice Models, Partial correlations with transfers: Ω and income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ΩRD 0.350** 0.268 0.192** 0.228**
(2.12) (1.35) (2.57) (2.21)
ΩDR 0.249 0.086 0.149 0.045
(1.47) (0.55) (1.64) (0.54)
Ω′RD 0.743*** 0.265 0.405*** 0.223**
(4.45) (1.34) (5.59) (2.17)
Ω′DR 0.232 0.001 0.149 0.000
(1.38) (0.01) (1.63) (0.00)
ID 0.792*** 0.420*** 0.501*** 1.343*** 0.722*** 0.864***
(6.46) (9.35) (8.56) (7.42) (9.84) (7.91)
IR 0.029 -0.023 0.014 0.020 -0.089 0.009
(0.26) (-0.60) (0.28) (0.14) (-1.23) (0.11)
N 4197 3664 9032 9032 4197 3664 9032 9032
Notes: Discrete Choice Models with t values in parentheses under the coefficient. Estimated co-
efficients are shown * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Column 1 (2) presents results from
Recipient (Donor) Fixed Effect Conditional Logit. Column 3 (4) presents results from a modified
Donor (Recipient) Random Effect Probit model. Columns 5 to 8 replicate these methods using Ω′
measures instead of Ω measures
In line with our models of pressure or exchange with recipient having full bargaining power, the
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results show that the higher the over-perception of income of donor the higher the transfers. Note
that the very weak level of significance of ΩRD in the regressions based on donor reports with Donor
Fixed Effect (columns 2 and 6) may be explained by the particularly low number of observations
contributing to the identification of the partial correlation.18
However, fixed effect (FE) type methods suffer from substantial efficiency losses as compared
to methods based on the random effect (RE) principle and suffer from inconsistency biases if there
are measurement errors. The latter may be of concern regarding our main variables of interest Ω,
Ω′, IR and ID.
19 Moreover, the double fixed effect approach provides no estimates for the donor
and recipient incomes, which are important to distinguish the predictions of our theoretical models
summarized in Table 8. Finally, they do not lend themselves easily to estimate discrete choice
models. For all these reasons, one may be concerned about the precise identification of the main
effects of interest β1, β2, β3 and β4 using FE-based methods displayed in equations (17) to (19).
To tackle these issues we estimated a Modified Random Effect model in line with Hajivassiliou
(2012), which extends the Mundlak-Chamberlain approach by characterizing the correlations be-
tween the unobserved persistent heterogeneities αi (i = R in equation (18) or i = D in equation
(19)), and regressors as follows:
E(αi|ΩRD,ΩDR,PRD, ID, IR,ZD,ZR) = µi = gi(Ω, P, I, Z)
assuming that gi(.) is a linear function of the regressors, that gi(.) depends only on the regressor
data for individual i and that gi(.) only depends on the regressors in a household j invariant way.
This method involves simply adding the fixed household i regressors and family network averages
of household j varying regressors as additional regressors in the right hand side of the models
specified by equation (18) and equation (19) and proceeding with the RE Probit estimator to
obtain consistent and efficient estimates. Note that we also nest the Random Effects within the
extended family network clusters to account for possible correlations.
Columns (3)-(4) of Table 11 for Ω and columns (7)-(8) for Ω′ show that our main results are
robust to using a modified RE approach to control for the unobserved heterogeneities that may
18A usual shortcoming of this approach is that the identification comes only from the switchers, which explains the
low number of observations reported at the bottom of the Table.
19However, we are less worried about measurement errors concerning the variable Ω than concerning Ω′, which is
one of the reasons why we may prefer the Ω measure for our results.
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characterize Recipients or Donors of transfers. As with the FE approach, we find significant and
positive correlations between transfers and misperceptions of donor’s income but no significant
correlations with misperceptions of recipient’s income, once controlled for both donor and recipient
actual incomes. We also find that the income of the donor is positively correlated to the transfers,
as expected with a model of pressure to give or exchange with recipient having full bargaining
power, and that the income of the receiver is clearly not significantly correlated to the transfers,
rejecting the model under altruism or exchange with donor having full bargaining power.
6.4 Robustness to using values of transfers.
So far, we have only looked at the extensive margin, as we believe that measurement errors are
less likely to plague reports on whether a transfer took place than on their exact value. On the
other hand, if that concern was unfounded, the intensive margin of transfers would contain more
information. The following table shows that our results are totally robust to using the value of the
transfers.
In addition, Table 20 in Appendix presents the same results using the net values of transfers.
This is to take into account the fact that there is a non negligible amount of bilateral transfers in
the sample. The results are unchanged.
7 Conclusion
This article analyzed how the misperceptions of income relate to the private transfers exchanged
between households belonging to the same family network. To do this we built novel measures
of asymmetric information based on assets mutually perceived among households belonging to a
same network. We apply these measures to original survey data collecting information in 2010
on households living in Tanzania, who are originated from the same families living in the Kagera
area eighteen years before the survey. Using the rich information available on their relationships
and characteristics, we validated our measures of mis-perceptions of income and show that the
degree of misperceptions increases with genetic, social and physical distance between households.
Interestingly we do not find that households are massively deceived in their perceptions of income,
even when relatives have migrated to urban areas.
We then developed simple static models to predict the correlations between income, mispercep-
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Table 12: Main regressions using transfer values
Equation
(17) (18) (19) (18) (19)
ΩRD 0.749** 0.348** 0.460**
(2.04) (2.09) (2.49)
ΩDR 0.043 0.342 0.091
(0.12) (1.64) (0.63)
Ω′RD 0.889*** 0.457**
(4.82) (2.47)
Ω′DR 0.339 0.030
(1.64) (0.19)
ID 0.951*** 1.617***
(8.37) (8.86)
IR 0.095 0.107
(1.04) (0.71)
N 9032 9032 9032 9032 9032
Notes: Fixed Effect Linear probability models with t values in parentheses under the coefficient. *
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Ω is set to 0 for dyads living in same location.
tions of income and transfers when altruism, exchange or pressure is the main driver of transfers.
We show that the predictions of these models differ. In particular, when the recipient has the active
role (either in a model of pressure to give or in a model of exchange in which the recipient holds
all the bargaining power), transfers have a positive partial correlation to the donor’s actual income
and to the recipient’s misperception of that income (a positive value of misperceptions indicating
over-estimation of income). In contrast, when transfers are motivated by pure altruism of the
donor, their partial correlation to the income of the recipient and to the misperception of it by the
donor are negative. Finally, the recipient’s income is negatively correlated to transfers under an
exchange model in which the donor holds the bargaining power.
Our data support a model of pressure to give or a model of exchange in which the recipient holds
the bargaining power. These results highlight the active role played by recipients of transfers in our
setting and show that it is possible to disentangle some motives of transfers using cross-sectional
household survey data on linked households and their perceptions of living standards.
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Appendix 1: Full set of recursive regressions leading to de-
termination of weights in Ω
Table 13: Consumption Regressions
First pass Second pass Final regression
HH located in urban area 0.218*** 0.260*** 0.261***
(3.520) (6.733) (6.773)
Panel member finished O level 0.236*** 0.230*** 0.230***
(2.834) (8.051) (8.041)
Panel member has a formal job 0.138 0.151** 0.187***
(1.516) (2.348) (5.771)
Owns house -0.122*** -0.086*** -0.090***
(-2.663) (-3.103) (-3.994)
Owns land -0.021 -0.014
(-0.310) (-0.394)
Owns livestock -0.104 0.148*** 0.148***
(-0.652) (4.976) (4.979)
Owns phone 0.292*** 0.331*** 0.332***
(4.553) (15.435) (15.482)
Owns TV, video equipment or camera 0.389*** 0.332*** 0.331***
(5.196) (12.716) (12.703)
Owns motorbike, car, truck or other vehicle 0.208* 0.146* 0.145*
(1.761) (1.731) (1.715)
Urban * completed O level 0.059
(0.950)
Urban * has formal job -0.016
(-0.232)
Urban * owns house 0.030
(0.508)
Urban * owns land 0.015
(0.205)
Urban * owns livestock -0.135** -0.135** -0.134**
(-2.073) (-2.100) (-2.087)
Urban * owns phone -0.105** -0.122*** -0.123***
(-2.141) (-2.738) (-2.751)
Urban * owns TV -0.049
(-0.871)
Urban * owns vehicle 0.148** 0.155** 0.156**
Continued on next page. . .
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First pass Second pass Final regression
(2.249) (2.494) (2.512)
Owns house * completed O level -0.030
(-0.364)
Owns house * has formal job -0.130
(-1.364)
Owns house * owns livestock 0.009
(0.089)
Owns house * owns phone 0.032
(0.506)
Owns house * owns TV 0.074
(1.010)
Owns house * owns vehicle 0.273** 0.244*** 0.245***
(2.384) (3.094) (3.117)
Owns land * completed O level -0.026
(-0.268)
Owns land * has formal job 0.178 0.047
(1.599) (0.658)
Owns land * owns phone 0.010
(0.119)
Owns land * owns vehicle -0.098
(-0.653)
Owns land * owns livestock 0.252
(1.367)
Owns land * owns TV -0.092
(-1.062)
Head is male 0.034 0.032 0.032
(1.226) (1.152) (1.143)
Age of hh head -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
(-1.057) (-1.143) (-1.129)
Head age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.078) (0.126) (0.111)
Males 0-5 years -0.220*** -0.220*** -0.220***
(-17.918) (-17.971) (-17.984)
Males 6-15 years -0.106*** -0.106*** -0.106***
(-10.447) (-10.477) (-10.507)
Males 16-60 years -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(-0.265) (-0.232) (-0.226)
Males 61+ years 0.049 0.051 0.051
(1.116) (1.156) (1.155)
Continued on next page. . .
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First pass Second pass Final regression
Females 0-5 years -0.211*** -0.212*** -0.213***
(-17.044) (-17.194) (-17.217)
Females 6-15 years -0.099*** -0.099*** -0.099***
(-9.667) (-9.701) (-9.715)
Females 16-60 years -0.044*** -0.045*** -0.045***
(-3.428) (-3.469) (-3.467)
Females 61+ years -0.090*** -0.090*** -0.090***
(-2.653) (-2.671) (-2.682)
Constant 13.335*** 13.306*** 13.296***
(140.787) (162.704) (165.868)
Adjusted R-squared 0.571 0.571 0.572
N 3173 3173 3173
Notes: Recursive regressions leading to estimation of Equation (3). t statistics in brackets under the coefficient. *
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Appendix 2: Proofs
Model of Pressure
We can rewrite the incentive constraint for type L in (10) as
uD(L)− uD(L− TL) ≤ P − p. (23)
It follows then directly from the concavity of uD that
uD(H)− uD(H − TL) ≤ P − p,
so that, if (23) holds a donor of type H would prefer pretending to be a low type than make zero
transfer and receive full pressure. It follows that the relevant constraint for type H is not to want
to pretend to be a low type (11). We can rewrite this constraint as
uD(H − TL)− uD(H − TH) ≤ p. (24)
Given his income x and the signal s received, the recipient R chooses p, TH and TL to maximize
πDs uR(x+ TH) + (1− π
D
s )uR(x+ TL) (25)
subject to (23) and (24).
Denoting as λ and µ the Lagrange multipliers on (23) and (24) respectively, the first order
conditions tell us that
πDs u
′
R(x+ TH) = µu
′
D(H − TH) (26)
(1− πDs )u
′
R(x+ TL) = λu
′
D(L− TL)− µu
′
D(H − TL), (27)
and that λ = µ if p ∈ (0, P ), while p = 0 if µ < λ and p = P if µ > λ.
Proof of Proposition 1
Assumption S1 implies that πDs is increasing in s, while Assumption S2 implies that π
D
s tends
to 0 when s tends to 0 and πDs tends to 1 when s tends to 1.
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For values of the signal s close to 0, πDs is close to 0. Equations (26) and (27) imply then that
µ is close to 0 while λ is strictly positive. It follows that p must be 0 and TL = TH . The recipient
offers a pooling contract. It is obvious from the objective that higher values of the signal gives
incentive to raise TH and to lower TL, thereby making a separating contract more likely. When the
signal s takes values close to 1, (1−πDs ) and therefore the left hand side of (27) is close to 0. Since
u′D(L− TL) > u
′
D(H − TL) for any TL > 0, it must be that µ > λ. Hence, p = P and TL = 0.
Thus, there is a cutoff value of the signal s˜ ∈ (0, 1) that is such that R offers a pooling contract
if sD ≤ s˜ and R offers a separating contract if sD > s˜ with TH (TL) increasing (decreasing) in s.
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Appendix 3: Summary statistics
Table 14: Summary statistics of household variables
Mean SD
Log consumption per capita 13.12 0.70
HH located in urban area 0.34 0.47
Panel member finished O level 0.13 0.33
Panel member has a formal job 0.09 0.28
Owns house 0.75 0.43
Owns land 0.87 0.34
Owns livestock 0.12 0.33
Owns phone 0.60 0.49
Owns TV, video equipment or camera 0.19 0.39
Owns motorbike, car, truck or other vehicle 0.09 0.29
Head is male 0.80 0.40
Age of hh head 41.04 15.14
Males 0-5 years 0.50 0.71
Males 6-15 years 0.60 0.87
Males 16-60 years 1.07 0.73
Males 61+ years 0.08 0.27
Females 0-5 years 0.49 0.70
Females 6-15 years 0.61 0.86
Females 16-60 years 1.11 0.74
Females 61+ years 0.11 0.33
Notes: N = 3, 173.
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Table 15: Summary statistics of dyadic variables
Sample Sample
N = 9, 032 N = 13, 808
Mean SD Mean SD
D reports giving gift to R in past 12 months 0.20 0.40 0.24 0.42
ΩRD 0.01 0.29 0.01 0.29
ΩDR 0.01 0.29 0.01 0.29
Ω′RD 0.01 0.52 0.00 0.52
Ω′DR 0.01 0.52 0.00 0.52
R places D low on ladder (LRD) 0.41 0.49 0.42 0.49
R places D high on ladder (LRD) 0.05 0.21 0.04 0.21
R answers DK on ladder question about D 0.11 0.31 0.09 0.28
D places R low on ladder (LDR) 0.41 0.49 0.42 0.49
D places R high on ladder (LDR) 0.05 0.21 0.04 0.21
D answers DK on ladder question about R 0.11 0.31 0.09 0.28
IR 13.19 0.72 13.13 0.69
R HH head is male 0.82 0.39 0.81 0.39
R HH head age 39.93 14.22 40.51 14.77
R HH head years education 6.74 3.27 6.40 3.23
R HH No. Males 0-5 years 0.49 0.69 0.51 0.71
R HH No. Males 6-15 years 0.60 0.87 0.62 0.89
R HH No. Males 16-60 years 1.08 0.74 1.07 0.71
R HH No. Males 61+ years 0.06 0.25 0.07 0.26
R HH No. Females 0-5 years 0.49 0.69 0.50 0.70
R HH No. Females 6-15 years 0.60 0.86 0.62 0.87
R HH No. Females 16-60 years 1.12 0.74 1.12 0.75
R HH No. Females 61+ years 0.10 0.31 0.11 0.32
Parent-child link 0.17 0.38 0.22 0.41
km distance 214.07 339.40 150.51 295.71
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Appendix 4: Robustness Tests
Table 16: Table 9 using transfers in
Equation
(17) (18) (19) (18) (19)
ΩRD 0.070* 0.036** 0.125***
(1.83) (2.14) (5.41)
ΩDR 0.046 0.037* 0.040**
(1.24) (1.77) (2.10)
Ω′RD 0.121*** 0.124***
(6.90) (5.37)
Ω′DR 0.037* 0.032*
(1.78) (1.67)
ID 0.057*** 0.149***
(5.54) (8.50)
IR 0.014 0.034*
(1.14) (1.75)
N 9032 9032 9032 9032 9032
Notes: Fixed Effect Linear probability models with t values in parentheses under the coefficient. *
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 17: Table 9, clustering at network level
Equation
(17) (18) (19) (18) (19)
ΩRD 0.088** 0.043** 0.053***
(2.10) (2.25) (2.67)
ΩDR 0.004 0.036* 0.008
(0.09) (1.70) (0.54)
Ω′RD 0.094*** 0.052***
(4.55) (2.65)
Ω′DR 0.035* 0.004
(1.68) (0.27)
ID 0.090*** 0.160***
(6.19) (7.22)
IR 0.007 0.009
(0.66) (0.62)
N 9032 9032 9032 9032 9032
Notes: Fixed Effect Linear probability models with t values in parentheses under the coefficient. *
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 18: Table 9 using consumption purged of transfers
Equation
(17) (18) (19) (18) (19)
ΩRD 0.088** 0.045** 0.053***
(2.23) (2.54) (2.71)
ΩDR 0.004 0.035 0.006
(0.09) (1.59) (0.41)
Ω′RD 0.104*** 0.053***
(5.27) (2.69)
Ω′DR 0.035 -0.008
(1.57) (-0.49)
ID 0.095*** 0.172***
(7.89) (8.89)
IR 0.001 -0.006
(0.15) (-0.36)
N 9032 9032 9032 9032 9032
Notes: Fixed Effect Linear probability models with t values in parentheses under the coefficient. *
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 19: Table 9 including dyads living in same location
Equation
(17) (18) (19) (18) (19)
ΩRD 0.088** 0.043** 0.053***
(2.23) (2.44) (2.70)
ΩDR 0.004 0.036 0.008
(0.09) (1.60) (0.54)
Ω′RD 0.094*** 0.052***
(4.77) (2.68)
Ω′DR 0.035 0.004
(1.58) (0.26)
ID 0.090*** 0.160***
(7.53) (8.27)
IR 0.007 0.009
(0.72) (0.57)
N 13808 13808 13808 13808 13808
Notes: Fixed Effect Linear probability models with t values in parentheses under the coefficient. *
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Ω is set to 0 for dyads living in same location.
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Table 20: Main regression using net transfer values
Equation
(17) (18) (19) (18) (19)
ΩRD 0.820*** 0.442*** 1.018***
(2.61) (3.29) (5.65)
ΩDR 0.260 0.138 0.226
(0.83) (0.79) (1.44)
Ω′RD 1.253*** 1.010***
(8.97) (5.62)
Ω′DR 0.136 -0.059
(0.79) (-0.40)
ID 0.636*** 1.583***
(7.74) (11.21)
IR -0.116 -0.193
(-1.23) (-1.30)
N 9032 9032 9032 9032 9032
Notes: Fixed Effect Linear probability models with t values in parentheses under the coefficient. *
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Ω is set to 0 for dyads living in same location.
55
